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Getting Inflation in Russia Down: A Tricky Task 
A Protectionist Environment and Restricted Competitiveness Feed Inflation 
Zusammenfassung 
Rußland kämpft mit hohen Inflationsraten bereits seit dem Zerfall der Sowjetunion, wobei schon 
die zentralistische Wirtschaftspolitik inflationär geprägt war. Damals herrschte ein Ungleichge-
wicht zwischen Angebot und Nachfrage mit der Folge eines beträchtlichen Geldüberhangs, wel-
cher nach der Freigabe der meisten Preiskontrollen durch die Regierung Gajdar zu einer Preisex-
plosion führte. 1992 gab es Hyperinflation und erst 1998 gelang eine deutliche Rückführung des 
Preisindex. Doch im selben Jahr brach der Wechselkurs des Rubels zusammen und es folgte eine 
erneute schwere Rezession mit rasch steigenden Inflationsraten. Inzwischen hat sich die 
Wirtschaft jedoch wieder erholt und die Zentralbank in Moskau prognostiziert eine Preis-
steigerungsrate um 12% für 2001 – und damit weniger als die voraussichtlichen 20% in diesem 
Jahr. Damit ist aber der geldpolitische Spielraum ausgeschöpft: Während ein stabilisierter Rubel 
eine deutliche importierte Inflation derzeit ausschließt, lassen die hohe Monopolisierung und der 
geringe Offenheitsgrad der Wirtschaft das Ziel einstelliger Inflationsraten in weite Ferne rücken. 
Inflation in postcommunist Russia has a long history beginning back in the Soviet era. An imbalance 
between supply and demand caused a huge money overhang, which fed through into a price explosion 
after the government of Egor Gaydar abolished most of the central price controls in 1992. The econ-
omy promptly slid into hyperinflation and the government struggled until 1998 to reduce the price 
index. But in the summer of that year the nominal ruble anchor collapsed and triggered another heavy 
depression, boosting inflation again. Currently, price growth is slowing down and the Central Bank 
forecasts an inflation rate of about 12 percent next year, down from the 20 percent that it at times 
reached in 2000. While a more stable ruble rules out large-scale imported inflation, the economy's 
high level of monopolization and limited openness to foreign investment/trade suggest a protracted 
battle to rein in price growth. 
The sources of recent price growth in Russia 
After the ruble crisis in August 1998 domestic prices soared, mainly because imports suddenly became 
much more expensive. At that time private consumption's share of the gross domestic product (GDP) 
was roughly 50 percent, and private households were spending about half of their disposable income 
on food and beverages. Moreover, 40 percent of all food consumed was imported, so imported items for 
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private consumption accounted for at least 10 per cent of GDP.1 As the dollar exchange rate tripled 
overnight, the inflation rate immediately reached an estimated 30 percent, solely because of the heavy 
dependence on food supplies from abroad (demand for food does not vary very much with changes in 
price and constitutes a large share of overall consumption). Later the weak ruble facilitated more im-
port substitution, while the monetary authorities managed to stabilize the exchange rate, thus reducing 
the impact of foreign trade on inflation. 
The federal budget balance – another key indicator – improved too. During the shaky post-crisis 
months the deficit soared once again after it had been somewhat reduced in summer 1998. It peaked in 
December of the same year at a worrisome – but to date unmatched – 5 percent of nominal GDP, forc-
ing the Central Bank to extend credits to the government and thus to increase the money supply. As 
output simultaneously contracted, the additional money fed through into higher prices. But later a 
miracle occurred, and the budget became more balanced, eventually achieving a respectable surplus. 
In the first half of 2000, for instance, the surplus reached between 4.5 and 7 pecent of nominal GDP. 
thus releasing the Central Bank from the need to finance the government. 
Although it is no longer necessary to print more money, the budget plan predicts double-digit inflation 
next year. So why are prices continuing to rise? The situation might not be so confusing if one were 
able to consider downward inflation as a trend, i.e., as a steady decline in the price level, GDP deflator 
and the like. In Russia, indeed, it has been lower in 2000 and looks set to diminish further in 2001. But 
such trends are rarely certain. The experience of curbing inflation is pretty varied – there are examples 
of a sudden change in inflation expectations and thus in inflation itself. A typical case is the introduc-
tion of a currency board, whereby the money supply is "outsourced" to a foreign central bank to rule 
out any excessive growth in the money base. Any other strictly austerity-based monetary policy may 
lead to a radical curb in price growth too. However, central banks and governments seldom use radical 
approaches, let alone in countries with a long-lasting depression or recession. On the contrary, they 
incline towards a smoother policy to avoid stifling an upcoming nascent recovery, and the Russian 
government is no exception. 
Yet history teaches that combating hyperinflation is sometimes easier than reducing single-digit infla-
tion rates. While welcoming an overall decline in the inflation rate, interest groups often resist further 
(as a rule real-sector) measures which may cut their rent they draw from a privileged position in the 
economy. Other things being equal, in such an environment of protracted reform expectations resist to 
change, elimination of inflation turns out to be an arduous task. Therefore, while the root of the prob-
lem may be monetary, inflation in Russia may also result from factors in the real sector. Usually, these 
concern the level of monopolization and the openness of the economy. The less domestic competition 
there is and the lower the share of tradable goods in total output, the more stubborn inflation is likely 
to be. 
The obstacles 
Since the introduction of the economic reforms much has happened in the Russian economy. Sectoral 
shifts have taken place in which industry lost out to the service sector. The bulk of newly established 
companies are located in services, although private firms perform well in other sectors too. The core 
sectors of the economy, however, are still dominated by old-style monopolies, which is due partly to 
technology and the need for capital centralization and partly by the lack of pressure for change. Thus, 
in the oil extracting and refining industry only big companies can survive, while in railway transporta-
tion and power generation there is no space for alternative grids. The problem is that in Russia private 
                                                     
Fifty 1 percent consumption x 0.5 food items (in money terms), x 0.4 food imports = roughly 10 percent of the GDP 
accounted for by food imports. 
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monopolies do not face international competition, whereas the so-called natural monopolies2 still en-
joy protection. While in bad times producers usually refrain from raising prices, in good times they 
demand more for their products. In such a situation the producer price index (PPI) outpaces the con-
sumer price index (CPI), signaling forthcoming inflation. Russian data appear to prove this: between 
mid-1998 and the first quarter of 1999 the PPI lagged behind growth in consumer prices. More pre-
cisely, an apparent difference occuredduring the crisis of August 1998 and its aftermath, as the margin 
between the two indices widened sharply. Whereas producer prices almost stagnated, the consumer 
price index displayed monthly growth rates of up to 38 percent. 
However, after the economy picked up things changed. Beginning in spring 1999 the price growth 
pace inverted and producer prices speeded up, albeit with bigger fluctuations, and clearly outpaced the 
CPI in 2000 (Diagram 1).  
Diagram 1: Weighted producer (PPI) and consumer (CPI) price indices 2000 
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Sources: Russian economic trends (RET), Monthly update, September 2000, Table 8 (www.hhs.se/site/ret); 
Banking & Finance weekly report, Interfax information services B.V., September 29, p. 6. 
However, a more accurate investigation of the circumstances causing inflation reveals how convinc-
ingly market forces work in Russia. One only needs to survey price developments in the food, retail 
and industrial wholesale sectors. Retail prices for food went up in the first half of 2000 very moderately, 
even compared with the weighted PPI, because fierce competition here strictly narrows profit margins. 
Conversely, the improved income situation of consumers caused prices for non-food goods and paid 
services to increase faster. They accelerated the PPI, while a possible "brake effect" of the slower 
growing food prices abated as the share of foods and beverages in overall household spending de-
creased parallel to the fast rise in real disposable income in the first half of the year. 
In contrast, the industrial price index picked up, reflecting a positive business sentiment and the 
stronger position of industrial companies in the Russian economy, which has not been restructured 
comprehensively yet (Diagram 2). Within the industrial sector the biggest price hikes took place in 
natural gas production, followed by oil extraction. Oil prices increased partly as a result of the price 
explosion on the international oil market, whereas the gas price is linked to energy prices as a whole 
and follows the trend. The energy price rises also, however, reflect the monopoly profit the companies 
gain by exploiting their privileged position with low exposure to international competition. After all, 
                                                     
2 In terms of micro-economics a natural monopoly may extend its marginal revenue without reducing the price, because 
there is no need to operate within a monopolistic competition. Examples of natural monopolies in Russia are the national 
railway company, the unified energy system, the gas monopoly Gazprom  and so forth. 
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oil prices rose more in oil extraxting Russia than they did abroad.3 Natural gas prices soared even 
more, by almost one half, fuelling suspicions that the gas giant Gazprom misuses its market power as 
the country's single gas supplier to dictate prices. Other monopolies probably did the same. Since the 
beginning of the year tariffs for freight forwarding by rail have risen by 41.3 percent, and for electric-
ity by one-third. In branches with more competition tariffs rose by far less. For instance, in the fairly 
deregulated and less concentrated road transportation sector they went up by just 16.7 per cent.4
Thus, improved macro-economic performance helped to curb inflation, but the toughest test is yet to 
come. It is hard to believe that stabilization will succeed without cracking down on the interests of the 
notorious Russian oligarchs, red directors and Soviet-style policymakers. Now measures are urgently 
needed which target the micro-level, aimed at further opening up Russia to international investors 
while simultaneously encouraging domestic competition. With internationally traded goods and ser-
vices making up a larger share of output, the margin between the nominal exchange rate and the ex-
change rate at purchasing power parities will narrow, making Russian stocks a more realistic and at-
tractive opportunity to foreigners. Rising foreign direct investment may expose the economy more to 
international price levels and impede arbitrary price hikes by domestic monopolies. Since the latter are 
mainly controlled by the financial oligarchs who emerged from the collapse of the former USSR, driv-
ing these people out of  business would mean greater stability and transformation success. 
Diagram 2: Industrial (IPI) and food price indices 2000 
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Sources: RET, op. cit. Table 8; Banking&Finance weekly report, op. cit., p. 6. 
The curse of the lavish dollar inflow 
The history of the Russian currency has mostly been a story of a legal tender which failed to gain con-
fidence. The reason is that a constant nominal devaluation/depreciation of the ruble took place be-
tween 1992 and 1999. With respect to the US dollar and other western currencies, the ruble is now 
thousands of times cheaper than it was initially. Yet recently, in the wake of the sudden dollar windfall 
resulting from lavish export revenues, this depreciation tendency has increasingly turned into apprecia-
tion pressure, either in nominal or real terms. As just outlined, the Central Bank has managed to stabi-
lize the nominal exchange rate, while the inflation rate remains relatively high, causing real apprecia-
tion. The current price growth arises – as explained – from the price policies of business on the one 
                                                     
3 In January-August, 2000, crude oil spot prices went up from US$ 27.3 to US$ 37.6 per barrel or 37.7 percent. In Russia 
they increased by 41.4 percent (Sources: Banking&Finance weekly report, Interfax information services B.V., September 
29, p. 6; BP, www.bpamoco.com). 
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4 Source: ibid. 
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hand and the money supply by the Central Bank on the other. Since the monetary authorities are not 
supposed to extend credits to the budget, the excessive growth of the monetary base right now reflects 
that same fortuitous dollar influx into the economy which helped to build up foreign exchange re-
serves. At the same time it poses a problem for the Central Bank. A proper sterilization may work for a 
while, but this tool is barely effective in a country where the bond market has collapsed and business 
securities are not seen as reliable instruments. 
A ruble revaluation would help, but right now neither big business nor the Finance Ministry are very 
enthusiastic about such an idea. Both the export sector and companies involved in import competition 
reject a cheaper dollar, while fiscal plans are based on calculations in ruble terms, so a higher dollar ex-
change rate benefits budget revenues. At the moment the Central Bank seems to have decided to bow 
to business, since only a crawling ruble devaluation in nominal terms is foreseen for 2001. The draw-
back is that the resulting ruble appreciation in real terms will diminish the purchasing power of the 
dollar in Russia. This is likely to make exporters reluctant to repatriate their revenues or, put another 
way, it will encourage capital flight again. More capital export will go at the expense of the investment 
demand and thus of growth and recovery. 
So the best policy seems to be the abolition of the compulsory conversion of export earnings into ru-
bles while pursuing a reliable ruble-dollar exchange rate to keep attracting foreign investment.5 With 
                                                     
take account of 5 Foreign investors the exchange rate in their calculations because it influences the returns on invested 
capital. Consequently, they prefer a forecastable one. 
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inflation kept under control domestic and foreign business will be able to plan better, thus contributing 
to steady growth and helping the economy to overcome the crisis once and for all. 
Ognian Hishow 
